Unions and Globalisation by Marta Aloi et al.
       
   research paper series 











Research Paper 2007/20 
 
 
















The Centre acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust            




Marta Aloi is a Lecturer in the School of Economics at University of Nottingham and an 
Internal Research Fellow in GEP. Manuel Leite-Monteiro is an Assistant Professor at the 
Catholic University of Portugal, Lisbon. Teresa Lloyd-Braga is an Associate Professor at the 



























We acknowledge Richard Disney, Daniel Seidmann and the participants to GEP research 
seminars for their useful comments. Marta Aloi gratefully acknowledges financial support form 








We analyze the effects of international integration of product and capital markets (i.e., 
globalisation) in a world where countries differ in their labour market institutions: one country 
has a perfectly competitive labour market while the other is unionized. We show that workers 
should favour autarky in the unionized country, but oppose it in the non unionized country. 
Vice versa for owners of capital. Aggregate gains from integration, however, are negative. We 
also show that, under capital mobility an increase in relative bargaining power of unions does 
not always improve workers' welfare: there is a critical level of bargaining strength above 
which an increase in union power reduces workers' income in the unionized country. 
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 Non-Technical Summary 
  
Free trade and liberalization of capital movements are often associated with the notion of globalisation, 
that is the process of international economic integration of the world economy. Although in the past the 
world has experienced other episodes of globalisation, the most recent one has the peculiarity of being 
characterized by a very rapid integration of world capital markets. Trade unions tend to fear free trade and 
capital markets liberalisation, their main concern being that before liberalisation takes place workers of the 
trading partner countries should be granted essential rights, preferably similar to those enjoyed by home 
workers. Unions claim that this requisite is aimed at benefiting all workers, the struggle being between 
workers and capital owners around the world and not between workers from different countries. As a 
matter of fact workers' resistance to the current process of globalisation and increased international 
competition is widespread in developed countries, and workers are increasingly feeling left out from 
sharing the gains of international economic integration. On the other hand, many of those who are in 
favour of liberalisation of world economic transactions claim that unions aim merely at protecting their 
embers against competition from workers of less regulated countries.   m
 
This paper provides a simple formal model in which such issue can be analysed. The conventional 
approach in the literature is to assume perfect competition in all markets and account for differences in 
returns by appealing to differences in fundamentals such as factor endowments, technologies or 
preferences. However, differences in market structure across countries may also cause the existence of 
differences in factor returns. For instance, unions with a sufficiently strong bargaining power in the labour 
market are usually able to ensure an income for their members (workers) higher than the level of wages 
that would be observed under perfect competition. Indeed, in a closed economy, unions are able to 
influence the distribution of income to the benefit of workers and at the expense of capital owners and of 
lower returns to capital. Accordingly, if union bargaining power differs across countries factor returns 
ould be different and we would expect international factor movements to occur if these were liberalized.  w
 
We set out a static model with two countries, each producing the same single good (hence there is no 
trade based on comparative advantage) using the same technology and having the same fixed level of 
capital and labour endowments under autarky. Symmetry allows us to focus on how, in an integrated 
world economy, divergences in the labour market structure across countries, per se, affect income levels 
and their distribution between capital owners and workers. We assume that there is perfect competition in 
the output and capital service markets. Hence, had both countries enjoyed perfect competition in the 
labour market, or the same degree of union bargaining power, no capital movements would occur 
ecause factor returns in the autarkic equilibrium would be the same in both countries.  b
 
We show that, with capital mobility, capital flows out of the highly unionised into the less unionised country 
and that such capital flows are inefficient at the world level, since capital movements are ultimately due to 
labour market distortions. Therefore, contrary to standard models (that is models in which factor 
movements are driven by differences in factor productivities) international capital mobility induces a 
decrease in output at the world level. Furthermore, the capital share of world output increases at the 
expense of workers' share of world output. In the paper, we also study the effects on workers' income of 
changes in the relative bargaining power between firms and unions. We show that, under free 
international capital mobility, an increase in union power in the highly unionised country may not work to 
the benefit of workers since it induces additional capital outflows with negative effects on labour 
productivity and on the marginal contribution of capital to output 1 Introduction
In the present paper we discuss the eﬀects of international capital movements on
factor income and welfare when union bargaining power diﬀe r sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .W e
show that capital ﬂows out of the highly unionised into the less unionised country
and that such capital ﬂows are ineﬃcient at the world level, since capital movements
are ultimately due to labour market distortions. Therefore, contrary to standard
models,1 international capital mobility induces a decrease in output at the world
level. Furthermore, the capital share of world output increases at the expense of
workers’ share of world output. In the paper, we also study the eﬀects on workers’
income of changes in the relative bargaining power between ﬁrms and unions. We
show that, under free international capital mobility, an increase in union power may
not work to the beneﬁt of union members. In fact, in contrast to what happens
under autarky, under capital mobility an increase in union power does not always
increase workers’ income, since it induces additional capital outﬂows.
Diﬀerences in factor returns across countries are considered to be an important
source of international factor movements. The conventional approach in the liter-
ature is to assume perfect competition in all markets and account for diﬀerences
in returns by appealing to diﬀe r e n c e si nf u n d a m e n t a l ss u c ha sf a c t o re n d o w m e n t s ,
technologies or preferences. However, diﬀerences in market structure across coun-
tries may also cause the existence of diﬀerences in factor returns. For instance,
unions with a suﬃciently strong bargaining power in the labour market are usually
able to ensure an income for their members (workers) higher than the level of wages
that would be observed under perfect competition. Indeed, in a closed economy,
unions are able to inﬂuence the distribution of income to the beneﬁto fw o r k e r s
and at the expense of capital owners and of lower returns to capital. Accordingly, if
union bargaining power diﬀers across countries factor returns would be diﬀerent and
1That is models in which factor movements are driven by diﬀerences in factor productivities.
1we would expect international factor movements to occur if these were liberalised.
Free trade and liberalisation of capital movements are often associated with the
notion of globalisation, that is the process of international economic integration of
the world economy. Although in the past the world has experienced other episodes
of globalisation, the most recent one has the peculiarity of being characterised by
a very rapid integration of world capital markets.2 Trade unions tend to fear free
trade and capital markets liberalisation, their main concern being that before lib-
eralisation takes place workers of the trading partner countries should be granted
essential rights, preferably similar to those enjoyed by home workers. Unions claim
that this requisite is aimed at beneﬁtting all workers, the struggle being between
workers and capital owners around the world and not between workers from dif-
ferent countries.3 As a matter of fact workers’ resistance to the current process
of globalisation and increased international competition is widespread in developed
countries, and workers are increasingly feeling left out from sharing the gains of
international economic integration.4 On the other hand, many of those who are
in favour of liberalisation of world economic transactions claim that unions aim
merely at protecting their members against competition from workers of less regu-
lated countries. The contribution of our p a p e ri st op r o v i d eas i m p l ef o r m a lm o d e l
i nw h i c hs u c hi s s u e sc a nb ea n a l y s e d .
2See the volume edited by M. Bordo, Alan Taylor and Jeﬀrey Williamson (2003) for a survey.
3This is the position of the general secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (Guy Ryder) and of the general secretary of the World Confederation of labour (Willy
Thys): ”It is argued that the doubling of the global labour force with the entry of Chinese, Russian
and Indian workers has changed the labour-capital ratio to the disadvantage of wage levels. Trade
unions do not want anyone excluded from the global economy nor believe they can be. But they
do want it subjected to reasonable regulations applicable to all countries, along with respect for
workers’ rights. Similarly, capital will continue to be internationally mobile and the world division
of labour will evolve accordingly.” (Financial Times, October 27th, 2006).
4The existing evidence on workers’ perceived impact of globalisation as a race to the bottom,
applies to both strongly unionised countries (e.g. Germany, France) and countries where trade
unions are weak and unemployment is low (e.g. U.S., U.K.). See for instance the work by Schieve
and Slaughter (2001), providing evidence that workers in the US increasingly fear the distributional
consequences of globalisation, and similar ﬁndings are reported by ILO (1999) for a wide sample
of countries.
2We set out a static model with two countries, each producing the same single
good,5 using the same technology and having the same ﬁxed level of capital and
labour endowments under autarky. Symmetry allows us to focus on how, in an
integrated world economy, divergences in the labour market structure across coun-
tries, per se,a ﬀect income levels and their distribution between capital owners and
workers. We assume that there is perfect com p e t i t i o ni nt h eo u t p u ta n dc a p i t a ls e r -
vice markets. Hence, had both countries enjoyed perfect competition in the labour
market, or the same degree of union bargaining power, no capital movements would
occur because factor returns in the autarkic equilibrium would be the same in both
countries. It is, therefore, the diﬀerence in union power between countries that
causes diﬀerences in capital returns, which in turn induces capital movements once
liberalisation takes place.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that in one of the two countries there is per-
fect competition in the labour market (that is union power approaches zero), while
in the other country the labour market is unionised. We show that, when capital
movements are liberalised, capital ﬂows from the unionised into the non unionised
country. As a result, workers’ income decreases, as well as output, while capitalists’
income increases in the unionised country. Vice versa in the non unionised country.
At the world level, income per capita and workers’ share of world output decrease.
Therefore, international capital mobility would not beneﬁtw o r k e r s ,e v e ni ft h eg a i n s
obtained by capital owners were eﬃciently redistributed among all individuals, both
at the world level and in the unionised country. This may explain unions’ resistance
towards globalisation in a world with disparate workers’ bargaining strength. In the
paper we also address the issue of what is the desirable level of union bargaining
power in the presence of internationally mobile capital. It is shown that there is
a critical level of union power above which an increase in union strength reduces
5Hence there is no trade based on comparative advantage.
3union members’ income.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we describe the autarkic equilibrium. In Section 4 we explore the eﬀects
of capital mobility, and Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a simple static model of two countries identical in everything except
for the union bargaining power. In each country there are ¯ K capitalists and ¯ N
workers, each exogenously supplying one unit of their respective factor service. Both
countries produce the same single good, taken as numeraire, with identical constant
returns to scale technologies. In each country there is a large number M of identical
ﬁrms, each ﬁrm producing yj units of output according to the following production
function: yj = F(kj,l j), j = A,B;w h e r ekj and lj represent, respectively, the units
of capital and labour used in production by a ﬁrm in country j.
Assumption 1. F(kj,l j) is a real, concave increasing continuous function for
(kj,l j) ∈ <2
+, positively valued and diﬀerentiable as many times as needed for
(kj,l j) ∈ <2
++,w i t hFk > 0a n dFl > 0.M o r e o v e r , F is homogeneous of de-











Capital is rented in a perfectly competitive market at the rental rate rj,w h i l e
wages and employment are determined through eﬃcient bargaining between unions
and ﬁrms. Unions are ﬁrm speciﬁc and workers are uniformly distributed among
them. Hence, each union represents nj ≡ ¯ N/M w o r k e r sa n dt a k e si t sn u m b e ro f
m e m b e r sa sg i v e n . 6 We assume that workers own private pension assets,7 that
6In many developed countries’ labour markets wage bargaining occurs at increasing decen-
tralised levels. Katz (1993), among others, reports evidence of the decetralisation in the structure
of collective bargaining in most developed economies since the early 1980s.
7This set up can be justiﬁed in a more general model by assuming that, in this economy, capital
4is they are also members of pension funds, and the latter invest only in domestic
corporate stocks.8 To diversify their portfolio pension funds own an equal amount of
every domestic ﬁrm. Accordingly, at a symmetric equilibrium, each worker receives
1/ ¯ N of each ﬁrm dividends out of his/her pension assets. For each union the
objective is to maximize the income of their members (wage and dividend earnings),
while ﬁrms’ objective is to maximize proﬁts.
We consider a two-stage game and assume that in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms pre-
commit to a given level of capital (kj) knowing that the wage, wj, and employment,
lj, will be negotiated afterwards in the second stage of the game. To obtain the eﬃ-
cient bargaining solution we solve the generalized Nash bargaining problem, where
the ﬁrm and union returns are net of their respective fallback (that is, net of the
level of their returns in case no agreement takes place and lj = 0). Accordingly, wj











,s . t . l
j ≤ n
j,
where 1 > γj ≥ 0 represents country j’s union bargaining power, F(kj,l j) − wjlj
represents the ﬁrm’s proﬁts net of its fallback (that is, net of capital rental cost rjkj),
and wjlj represents the income of union members net of their fallback (that is, net of
the income coming from their private pension assets). The solution to this problem
is: lj = nj and wj = γjF(kj,n j) 1
nj.9 By anticipating this bargaining outcome, the
owners are risk neutral while workers are risk averse and want to ensure themselves against future
income uncertainties.
8Private pension funds (and other means of private old-age maintenance) are particularly
widespread among workers in anglosaxon countries; while in many other countries, inside and
outside the Oecd - that have traditionally relied on unfunded wage related pensions - private
funded pensions are increasingly taking over. The strong home bias displayed by pension and
other institutional assets in Oecd countries is widely documented. For instance, in the Netherlands
and Switzerland (which are the countries with the highest pension assets share in GDP among
Oecd members), foreign asset shares as percentage of total of pension funds only amounted to an
average of 10% in 1993. In the same period, foreign asset shares as percentage of total pension
funds was less than 5% in the US.
9Note that workers’ bargained wage is higher than the perfectly competitive wage (Fl), provided
5representative ﬁrm will choose to commit to the level of capital that maximizes
proﬁts, (1 − γj)F(kj,n j) − rjkj,w h i c hl e a d st ot h eﬁrst order condition: rj =
(1 − γj)Fk(kj,n j). Using the Euler relations for the production function, it is easy
to obtain the equilibrium levels of proﬁts: (1 − γj)Fl(kj,n j)nj. At the symmetric
equilibrium, each worker receives from its pension fund assets the equivalent to
proﬁts of one ﬁrm and, therefore, income per worker becomes: w∗j = γj F(kj,nj)
nj +
(1 − γj)Fl(kj,n j), which can also be written as Fl(kj,n j)+γjFk(kj,n j)kj
nj.
Exploiting symmetry of equilibrium, and the property of homogeneity of the
production function, aggregate output is given by Y j = F(Kj,L j), where Kj ≡
Mkj and Lj ≡ Mlj represent countries’ total capital and labour services utilization.
Since equilibrium in the labour market requires that Lj = ¯ N, the equilibrium values
for factors’ income can be written as,
r
j =( 1 − γ
j)FK(K




























Note that when γj = 0 we recover the case of a perfectly competitive market; the
rental costs of capital and labour income corresponding to their marginal products
and, given the joint assumptions of constant returns and perfect competition, zero
equilibrium proﬁts. Compared to the perfectly competitive case, in the unionised
country labour earns above its marginal product and the return to capital is below
that union power is suﬃciently strong, i.e., γ > Fll
F .
6its marginal product.10
3A u t a r k y
A tt h ea u t a r k i ce q u i l i b r i u mKj = ¯ K,w i t hj = A,B,a n dY A = F( ¯ K, ¯ N)=Y B.
Two results are now worth emphasizing, for further comparison with the case of
international capital mobility. First, since technologies and factor endowments are
completely symmetric across countries, KA = KB = ¯ K represents the world eﬃcient
allocation and, therefore, world output is maximized at the autarkic equilibrium.
Second, although the two countries have t h es a m ea g g r e g a t eo u t p u t ,t h ei n c o m e
distribution between workers and capital owners diﬀers, since it depends on the
union bargaining power. Accordingly, workers’ income and workers’ income share
are higher, while capital rentals and capital share in output are lower, the higher is
the union bargaining power. In fact, diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to γ we obtain,
dw∗j
dγj
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Aut




We can then establish the following property.
Proposition 1 . Under autarky, an increase (decrease) in union bargaining power
increases (decreases) workers’ per capita income.







= FK( ¯ K, ¯ N)
¯ K
Fj, which is also positive. Hence, in a closed economy where
inputs are fully utilized, the higher the union power the better oﬀ are the workers as
they can appropriate a larger share of income. If capital movements are liberalised,
however, capital owners have the option to invest capital abroad and, as we shall
10Contrary to partial equilibrium settings, where ﬁrms take as given the interest rate and union
bargaining power leads to underinvestment (see, e.g., Grout 1984), in our general equilibrium
setting the eﬀect of union bargaining power is to reduce interest rates (since demand of capital
eventually decreases, although supply remains constant).
7see below, the impact of increased union power on workers’ welfare may become
negative.
4 Capital mobility
We assume that capital owners can invest their endowments in both countries, even
though those capital movements are not accompanied by physical movements of
capitalists. Their investment decision depends on the return on capital in countries
A and B.
4.1. Equilibrium. Under free capital mobility, in addition to (1) and (2),
a no-arbitrage condition in the world capital market (rA = rB) needs to be sat-
isﬁed together with the world capital market clearing condition. Accordingly, the
















B =2 ¯ K.( 7 )
From the no arbitrage condition in the capital market (6), and by use of (7), it can
be checked that if γA = γB then the solution KA = KB = ¯ K would be obtained,
which is identical to the solution under autarky. Indeed, if the two countries were
characterised by the same union bargaining power, no capital movements would be
observed, and the equilibrium solution would precisely be the eﬃcient one. There-
fore, the no-arbitrage condition above implies that capital movements are induced
by diﬀerences in union power.
Hereafter, we denote unions bargaining power in country A by γA = γ and, to
simplify matters, we assume that in country B there is perfect competition in the
labour market, that is γB = 0. Accordingly, we impose the following,
Assumption 2. γA = γ and γB =0 .
8In the lemma below we state conditions under which an equilibrium exists and
is unique.




2 ¯ K − KA, ¯ N
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2 ¯ K − KA, ¯ N
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> 0. Then, under capital mo-
bility there is a unique solution
¡
KA,KB¢
satisfying KB > ¯ K>K A.
Proof. By use of (7), and given Assumption 2, (6) can be written as Z(KA) ≡
FK
¡






, and a solution for KA satisﬁes Z(KA)=0 .














, provided that lim
KA→0
Z(KA) < 0 and lim
KA→2 ¯ K
Z(KA) > 0. Moreover,
Z( ¯ K)=FK
¡ ¯ K, ¯ N
¢
−(1−γ)FK
¡ ¯ K, ¯ N
¢
= γFK
¡ ¯ K, ¯ N
¢
> 0; therefore, since Z(KA)
is an increasing function of KA, it can only become zero for KA < ¯ K.
From Lemma 1, equilibrium capital services are higher in country B (KB >
¯ K>K A), that is capital ﬂows from the more to the less unionised country. These
capital outﬂows from country A imply in turn that workers’ income in the unionised
country is lower under capital mobility than under autarky. In view of (2), and using
of the Euler relations, we can derive the eﬀect of capital mobility on workers’ income


























, j = A,B. By Assumption 1,
the expression dw∗A
dKA takes positive values. Since the utilization of capital services
in country A is smaller under capital mobility than under autarky, (8) implies
that workers’ income in the unionised country decreases when international capital
movements are liberalised. Obviously, capitalists’ income in country A increases,
since the return to capital is a decreasing function of KA.
9Let us now study the eﬀects of capital mobility on total income of country A.








KB − ¯ K
¢
.11 Diﬀerentiating the latter expression with respect to KA and by













B − ¯ K
¢¤
> 0. (9)
This expression takes a value zero at the autarkic solution, since KA = KB = ¯ K;
and becomes positive as soon as capital mobility is allowed. Indeed dXA
dKA > 0s i n c e :
FB
KK < 0 by Assumption 1 and, at equilibrium,
¡
KB − ¯ K
¢
> 0a n dFA
K >F B
K under
Assumption 2. Accordingly, moving from autarky to free capital mobility implies
that the unionised country experiences a loss in national income.
Deriving the eﬀect of capital liberalisation in country B is straightforward. Since








KB − ¯ K
¢







B − ¯ K
¢
< 0. (10)
Accordingly, XB increases as KA decreases and thus income in the competitive
country is higher under capital mobility than under autarky. Obviously, wages in
country B increase (the capital rental rate decreases), since Euler relations together
with concavity of F require that the marginal productivity of labour (of capital) is
an increasing (decreasing) function of K.














K > 0. (11)
11Since capital movements are not accompanied by physical movements of capital owners, we
need to distinguish between national and domestic product.
10With international capital ﬂows FA
K >F B
K, hence as KA decreases world output
decreases as a result of the ineﬃcient allocation of capital across countries. Accord-
ingly, we can establish the following.
Proposition 2 . Under capital mobility, income in the unionised country and in
the world is lower than under autarky.
Due to the diﬀerent degree of distortion in labour markets the rental rate of
capital is higher in the less unionised country, thus inducing ineﬃcient capital move-
ments; output in this country increases but at the expense of an even higher decrease
of output in the more unionised country, thus leading to lower world output.
Note that capital share in domestic output in country A is increasing in KA.
Hence, recalling that under autarky sA
K <s B
K, capital mobility further reduces the
unionised country’s share of capital in output.12 The workers’ share of world output
at the free capital mobility equilibrium is given by w∗A ¯ N+wB ¯ N















































Since the share of capital in output is lower in the unionised than in the non
unionised country, then, liberalisation of capital movements brings about an increase
in the share of world output of capital owners at the expense of workers’ share of
world output.13
4.2. Changes in relative bargaining power. We now study how, in a















F A > 0.
13Note that this occurs despite ﬁrms’ dividends being distributed to workers (via their pension
assets). Had we not allowed for private pension assets, we would have observed even larger losses
in workers’ share of world output.
11strength of workers, relative to ﬁrms in country A,a ﬀects the equilibrium. Totally
diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to γ, and accounting for (7), gives us the impact of












dγ > 0. Accordingly, an increase in union power in country
A widens the diﬀerence in returns of capital across countries, favouring capital
movement into country B even further. Since XA, XB and Y T do not directly
depend on γ,t h ee ﬀect of a change in γ on national income in both countries, and

























Under autarky, capital and labour utilization in each country is ﬁxed at equilib-
rium and, therefore, output is constant and unaﬀected by changes in union power.
Equations (14)-(16) show however that, under capital mobility, a higher union power
i m p l i e san e tl o s si nn a t i o n a li n c o m ei nt h eu n i o n i s e dc o u n t r ya n di nt h ew o r l d( a n d
a net gain in the competitive country). The following proposition summarizes this
result.
Proposition 3 . Under capital mobility, income in the unionised country and in
the world is negatively correlated with union bargaining power.
Proposition 3 implies that the unionised country and the world are worse oﬀ
when worker bargaining strength increases, due to the higher distortion in the
12unionised country labour market and the induced ineﬃcient capital movements.
The competitive country, however, is better oﬀ f o rh i g h e rv a l u e so fγ.
We now ask if, given internationally mobile capital, an increase in union power
can, after all, beneﬁt workers in the unionised country. To study the sign of the
correlation between union power and workers’ income in the unionised country
under capital mobility, we totally diﬀerentiate (2) with respect to γ and obtain
dw∗A
dγ












,( 1 7 )
where dw∗A
dKA is given by (8). The expression above reﬂects the fact that an increase
in γ aﬀects workers’ income through two channels (see 2). A direct channel, which
raises the workers’ income share for a given level of output; and an indirect channel
linked to the capital outﬂow triggered by the increase in union power. The eﬀect




(17) and is analogous to what happens under autarky (see 5). The second channel
bears two eﬀects, the sum of which is captured by the second term on the rhs of
(17). In view of (2) these two eﬀects are: (i) A decrease in the marginal productivity
of labour (i.e., FA
L ); (ii) A change in the marginal contribution of capital to output
(i.e., FA
KKA). The latter cannot be signed a priori, since it depends on the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour. However, using (8) and (13), it can be












¯ N . Accordingly, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 . Under capital mobility, an increase (decrease) in union bargain-
ing power increases (decreases) workers’ income by less than under autarky.
Although changes in union power do not aﬀect national product nor world out-
put at the autarkic equilibrium, they do aﬀect its distribution between capital own-
ers and workers. As seen earlier, union power and workers’ income in the unionised
13country are positively correlated under autarky. However, whether under capital
mobility an increase in union power is able to increase workers’ income at all de-
















, which yet again depends on the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, as well as on the levels of KA
and KB. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the following result applies.
Proposition 5 . Under capital mobility, there is a threshold value γ∗ above (below)
which workers’ income in the unionised country decreases (increases) with γ.







































< 0f o rγ > γ∗.
Proposition 5 means that unions that are willing to maximize workers income,
under internationally mobile capital, face a critical level of bargaining power, γ∗;
pushing their bargaining power beyond that level will only hurt workers.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have shown that, if one country is unionised whereas the other is not, unions will
always prefer autarky but the competitive country and its workers will be better oﬀ
under free movements of capital. Capital owners, on the other hand, beneﬁtf r o m
capital movement liberalisation when this is induced by the presence of unions in
their domestic market, whereas those residing in the competitive country would
suﬀer a decrease in their per capita income. The aggregate gain though is negative,
since capital ﬂows are induced by a distortion in returns.
With capital internationally mobile, however, the world would gain if the non
unionised country were to converge to the same degree of unionization of the other
14country. In this case no factor movements would occur at equilibrium, and work-
ers of the unionised country would also be better oﬀ. Accordingly, for workers
in unionised countries it makes sense to push towards achieving, prior to integra-
tion, similar levels of bargaining strength around the world. In contrast, under
asymmetric unionization and integrated goods and capital markets, if workers’ bar-
gaining strength in the unionised country is relatively high, a reduction in union
power actually beneﬁts union members, as it limits the size of capital ﬂows out of
the unionised country and its negative eﬀects on labour productivity and on the
marginal contribution of capital to output.
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